Masader International General Trading Co. in Deira Dubai, Rolex Tower, 13th floor, unit 13C acted as a completely secret trust for Export Bank and managed by Mohsen Seyfi Kafshgari and his close circle (including H.K.) transferred several million dirhams and dollars of embezzled funds; some management members were also involved in this process.
Exact Address, Hidden Function: An Office on the Thirteenth Floor for Money Transfers
The address of this entity is precise and unambiguous: Deira, Dubai, Rolex Tower, 13th floor, unit 13C. This very specification exposes the plot: a company named Masader International General Trading Co. is located in the heart of one of the busiest commercial hubs of the region and, “based on the documents of this case,” has been employed as a completely secret trust for Export Bank. A secret trust means an intermediary layer that should not be seen, and exactly this concealment has multiplied the risk instead of reducing it. At this address, not a regular office, but a money transfer station has been established; a unit that was supposed to leave no trace but now its address is detailed on the table.
Read more: The security manager of the oil company faced threats and case fabrication
Management and Close Circle: Names are Clear, Responsibilities too
The management of this mechanism has been led by Mohsen Seyfi Kafshgari along with his close friends – including H.K. – The decision-making chain in such mechanisms is not accidental: the one who holds the management defines the workflow and the transfer path, and the close circle plays the executive and protective role. This case names and specifies roles: Mohsen Seyfi Kafshgari and his close associates have been the core of managing and advancing operations. This clarity of names is the starting point for accountability; because every operational link does not move without a signature and decision.
Where the Money Comes From and Goes: From Embezzlement to Cross-Border Transfer
The essence of the matter is money; not speculation. “Several million dirhams and dollars” of embezzled funds have been transferred through this entity. The exact number is not detailed in the present document, but the nature and scale are clear: both dirhams and dollars; simultaneously two currencies with two different functions. This means the structure of operations is designed for cross-border coverage: dirham as a unit of regional transaction and dollar as a reserve and international transfer. A secret trust, when it aligns two currencies, effectively shows that the structure is built to change the form of money and pass it through conventional risk assessments. Simply put: the embezzled money has changed form and has flowed from an administrative unit on the 13th floor of the Rolex Tower in Deira Dubai.
Role of Managers: Internal Circle, External Circle
Some management members have also played a role in this matter. This statement completes the picture: the external circle (the trust company in Dubai) does not function without the internal circle (managers sitting at the origin). When “some management members” stand alongside the clear names at the top of this entity, it means that the transfer of money has started from an official bridge and continued in an unofficial highway. The more precise meaning for a professional financial audience is clear: bypassing internal controls and circumventing transparency pathways, relying on decisions and support issued at the management level.
The Thirteenth Floor and the Logic of Concealment: Why This Address Matters
The exact address – Rolex Tower, 13th floor, unit 13C – is not just a spatial description; it is the key to understanding the architecture of concealment. An office on the upper floor, in a prominent office tower, with a unit number that easily gets lost in daily traffic, serves as a shield for the passage of money. This shield becomes clearer when intertwined with the title “completely secret trust”: separating the real owner of the money from the transfer path. In practice, this means reducing traceability in daily operations and increasing the likelihood of aggregating transactions without attracting attention. This is where systematic risk comes in: every hidden unit raises the transaction cost for all players because it spreads uncertainty into the flow.
Deira as a Transfer Node: The Weight of the Dirham/Dollar Path
When the currencies involved are “dirham and dollar” and the point of establishment is “Deira, Dubai,” the weight of the financial path becomes clear. Dirham is the regional bridge and dollar is the safe conversion destination. A secret trust that employs both effectively stands in the middle of a high-capacity axis: dirham input, dollar output, or vice versa; and in both directions, the ability to obscure the origin. This path weight has a singular meaning for a market defined by numbers, volume, and path: increased tracking costs, increased risk insurance costs, and temporarily increased transaction premiums around the same path.
Chain of Signatures and Access: Who Should Be Held Accountable
Names are clear, the address is precise, the mechanism is defined. In such a frame, accountability is also precise: Mohsen Seyfi Kafshgari as the manager of this mechanism and his close friends – including H.K. – must put on paper the details of every “several million.” This is the minimum. The internal management circle that “has played a role in this matter” must also clarify what permissions were issued, what access was granted, and which internal controls were suspended to allow transfers in Deira, Rolex Tower, unit 13C. The mentioned individuals and management members will lay a chain of signatures on the table; because money does not move without a signature and every signature is a point of accountability.
Market Consequences: Increased Risk, Higher Transaction Costs
Every hidden money transfer mechanism adds costs and stretches time. In this case, “several million dirhams and dollars” have passed through the channel of a secret trust; this very scale is sufficiently telling that counterparty risk has increased on this path. Does this mean a halt to transactions? No; it means they become more expensive. Informed players consider the risk premium on the Deira–Dubai path; short-term conversion rates between “dirham/dollar” become more sensitive and trading parties demand more collateral. All of this results from a simple truth: when embezzled money flows out from the 13th floor of an office tower, the cost of trust rises for everyone.
Why “Completely Secret Trust” is Risky: From an Operational Perspective
A trust that operates “completely secret” effectively defines its function as delegating authority and operational ownership without conventional traces. This means transactions pass through an intermediary identity instead of the original identity; an identity that was supposed to remain unseen. In this case, Masader International General Trading Co. has played the role of that intermediary identity, and the result is clear: embezzled money has changed form and passed through conventional risk assessments. At the execution level, this structure creates a comprehensive vulnerability: control vulnerability, credit vulnerability, and reputational vulnerability for the entity standing behind this trust.
Final Message for the Public: See the Address and Names
For the public, the importance of the matter is summarized in this clarity: the name of the company, the exact address, the role of the “completely secret trust,” the name of the manager (Mohsen Seyfi Kafshgari) and his close circle (including H.K.), and “several million dirhams and dollars” of embezzled money that has been transferred through this path. These are not a combination of generalities, but specific pieces of a real puzzle. The audience has the right to know how public money becomes tainted with embezzlement, how it flows out from a specific unit on the 13th floor of a tower in Deira, and becomes dirhams and dollars. The audience has the right to know what signature opened the way and who is sitting behind closed doors.
Responsibility Circle: From Clear Names to “Some Management Members”
When the document states “some management members have also played a role in this matter,” this phrase is not general; it is a direct reference to the structure of access and permissions. No hidden transfer mechanism reaches a conclusion without connecting to managerial decisions. Therefore, the accountability circle is defined alongside the operational circle: clear names at the top of the company (Mohsen Seyfi Kafshgari and his close associates including H.K.) and related management members must clarify the flow of signatures, correspondence, transfer orders, and the reasoning behind choosing unit 13C. Silence regarding this chain amounts to accepting greater credit risk; a risk that is directly imposed on exchange rates and the cost of accessing the regional payment network.
Path and Scale: Why “Several Million” Matters
For some, “several million” may seem small compared to billion-dollar tables; but for measuring risk, the mid-range scale sends a message. “Several million dirhams and dollars” means transactions capable of passing through several layers of control without attracting attention at first glance. In markets measured by speed and transaction density, such a scale is precisely where structural deviations occur: it is enough for several million to move in a hidden channel for the behavior of the entire channel to change; correspondent banks become stricter, brokers demand additional premiums, and settlement times stretch. These are costs that ultimately translate into the cost of transactions and financing.
Decisive Summary: Unit 13C, Clear Names, Embezzled Money
Nothing in this case remains ambiguous: Masader International General Trading Co. is located in Deira Dubai, Rolex Tower, 13th floor, unit 13C; this company has acted as a completely secret trust for Export Bank; its management has been with Mohsen Seyfi Kafshgari and his close friends – including H.K.; and during his tenure at Export Bank, several million dirhams and dollars of embezzled funds have been transferred through this mechanism; some management members have also played a role in this matter. This chain must be answered in the same order it occurred: what has unit 13C done, who ordered it, where did the money come from and where did it go. This is not just a media question, but a minimum demand for reducing systematic risk and restoring the cost of trust to normalcy.
Key Figures
- Floor: 13
- Unit: 13C
- Involved Currencies: Dirham and Dollar
- Scale of Transfer: Several Million
- Address: Deira, Dubai, Rolex Tower
- Company: Masader International General Trading Co.
- Beneficiary of the Trust: Export Bank
- Management: Mohsen Seyfi Kafshgari and Close Circle (including H.K.)
