Brent settled at $101.21 on September 9, 2026, and intraday on September 10 reached around $108; simultaneously, Mokha fell into the hands of the Houthis, the distance of forces from the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint reached about 80 kilometers, and official media reports about the presence and guidance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the coastal front of Yemen were published.
According to field and security reports, the Houthis seized the port of Mokha on Thursday, September 10, and on the evening of Friday, September 11, regional media reported Saudi airstrikes on Mokha airport. With the fall of Mokha—about 50 miles from Bab al-Mandab—the center of shipping risk shifted from the southern Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and its effect on oil prices and insurance costs was immediately evident.
On the intelligence-military level, CNN quoted American officials stating that "hundreds of officers" of the IRGC are present in Yemen and are working directly with the Houthis, alongside which "more than 100" American military advisors have been stationed in Saudi Arabia for intelligence support and targeting. Reuters also reported that the recent coastal advance of the Houthis was conducted with "direct guidance" from the IRGC, and several senior IRGC commanders had previously gone to Yemen to oversee some operations.
A diplomatic warning was also issued simultaneously: Hans Grundberg, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, described the situation in Yemen as a "new and more dangerous phase" in this week's meetings and new official messages, considering its transnational consequences to be certain.
The energy market responded rapidly to this new risk arrangement. On September 9, Brent became three-digit for the first time since July, closing at $101.21; on September 10, news agencies reported a momentary spike of Brent to around $108 in New York trading, and data the next day showed prices fluctuating in the range of $100 to $102. Simultaneously, technical reports from the physical market indicate that "dated Brent" has stabilized above $100 since September 3.
In the regional political scene, Axios reported that Mohammed bin Salman on Thursday, September 10, requested Donald Trump to take action against the Houthis in two phone calls; simultaneously, the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling for the lifting of the blockade on Yemen and an immediate return to dialogue. Both signals directly referenced the risk of Bab al-Mandab.
To assess the risk burden on energy routes, two reliable operational indicators are: 1) transit flows and 2) insurance prices. According to the analysis of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2023, about 12% of the world's seaborne oil was transported through the Red Sea chokepoints—including Bab al-Mandab. In 2024 and 2025, with increasing threats, transit through the Red Sea declined, and the long route around the Cape of Good Hope increased; the eight-month average for 2024 saw oil transit from Bab al-Mandab drop to 4.0 million barrels per day, while transit around Africa reached 9.2 million barrels per day.
In terms of insurance prices, marine insurance industry data shows that with the intensification of Houthi attacks, the "war premium" for passage through the southern Red Sea significantly increased: estimates from September 9 indicate a rise in rates to about 0.7% of the vessel's hull value, while a week prior it was around 0.3%. The list of "high-risk areas" by the Joint War Committee in London was also updated on July 29, 2026, confirming the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as high-risk areas.
On the operational field, the fall of Mokha has two immediate consequences for the energy chain: first, a direct threat to tanker traffic in the chokepoint; second, increased time and costs for alternative routes. The U.S. Maritime Administration in its active warning has listed specific hazards for vessels associated with the U.S., the U.K., and Israel. Additionally, analytical reports from Lloyd's List indicate that despite increased traffic in the Suez Canal due to the Hormuz crisis, the new threats from the Houthis in the southern Red Sea have prevented a full recovery of traffic in Bab al-Mandab.
In the operational landscape of Yemen, the pattern of operations on the western coast is described as a "compressed strip" between the port of Al Hudaydah and Mokha; controlling these axes enhances the ability to "contain" Bab al-Mandab. Reuters emphasized in its narrative that Iran has facilitated the rapid advance of the Houthis by sending weapons and advice and operationally guiding the IRGC, with trips by senior commanders to Yemen to oversee some recorded attacks.
In the energy policy layer, the EIA explains that from 2024, part of Saudi oil was transferred to Red Sea terminals via the "East-West Pipeline" to bypass Hormuz and the risks of the Red Sea, but tensions in Bab al-Mandab in 2024-25 also limited this diversion. In such a situation, any security fluctuation around Mokha and the chokepoint directly adds to the "geopolitical premium" in the Brent futures and physical market.
Price data from September 9 and 10 shows the path of this premium: Brent's return to three digits, a momentary leap to $108, and then stabilization above $100 in the following day's trading. In this context, physical market indicators—including the jump in "dated Brent"—confirm a relative shortage of deliverable supply in European ports and sellers' caution in issuing bills of lading from the Red Sea route.
In summary, three definitive axes emerge: 1) the field: the fall of Mokha and the approach to the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint and retaliatory airstrikes; 2) intelligence: simultaneous reports from CNN about the presence of "hundreds of officers" of the IRGC in Yemen and the deployment of over 100 American advisors in Saudi Arabia; and 3) geopolitics: the UN's explicit warning about Yemen's "more dangerous phase" and Riyadh's request from Washington for action against the Houthis. These three axes have simultaneously shifted price, route, and risk in the oil chain.
Key Numbers
- $101.21: Brent settlement on September 9, 2026.
- ≈$108: Intraday peak of Brent on September 10.
- $100.34: Final price of Brent on September 10 (FT).
- ≈80 kilometers (50 miles): Distance from Mokha to Bab al-Mandab.
- "Hundreds of officers" of the IRGC in Yemen; "more than 100" American military advisors in Saudi Arabia.
- 0.7% of hull value: War premium for passage through the southern Red Sea after the intensification of attacks (up from 0.3%).
- 9.2 million barrels per day: Oil transit around the Cape of Good Hope in the eight months of 2024 (up from 6.0 in 2023).
- JWLA-034 Update: Confirmation of the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as high-risk areas (July 29, 2026).
- "New and more dangerous phase": Official description by the UN Special Envoy of the situation in Yemen.
- Dated Brent above $100 since September 3 (LSEG).
The market's short-term focus is a direct result of pragmatic control over the Mokha-Al Hudaydah coast and the deterrent messages from the parties. In a scenario of continued threats to shipping within 50 miles of Bab al-Mandab, the geopolitical premium on the Brent curve will be maintained, and insurance and freight costs on alternative routes (Cape of Good Hope) will gradually spill over into product prices at import terminals; in a scenario of providing security guarantees to the commercial fleet and managing risk at the chokepoint, a significant portion of this premium will be removed from prices, and demand elasticity in Asia and Europe will dominate the price path.
