Between June and August 2026, 72 to 80 million barrels of crude oil were allocated with a discount of $8 to $17 per barrel on credit to four trustees — Ali Bayandarian, Rouhollah Razavi, Hossein Shamakani, and Mohammad-Hadi Momenin — a discount that reduced Iran's oil revenue by $576 to $680 million and placed the 37-year-old Momenin, with a history of 743 billion tomans in bank debt, at the center of a sales, settlement, and currency transfer network.
These figures speak the language of the energy market: volume, price, route, and settlement. The route passes through the signing of credit allocation in the structure of the Ministry of Oil, reaches large shipments at sea, passes through the currency exchange network and cover companies, and ultimately must return to the treasury. However, in Mohammad-Hadi Momenin's case, the return loop stands with a warning sign; when the name of a major bank debtor appears alongside the allocation of several tens of millions of barrels, unprecedented discounts, and international cases such as Venezuela, the issue is no longer 'market risk', but 'direct transfer of national wealth'.
Credit allocations; what the numbers say and who should be held accountable
According to media reports including Hamshahri and Kayhan, the four trustees Ali Bayandarian, Rouhollah Razavi, Hossein Shamakani, and Mohammad-Hadi Momenin placed a total of 72 to 80 million barrels of crude oil between June and August 2026; this was done with a discount of about 8%, calculated at the floor and ceiling of the market as $8 to $17 per barrel. The practical meaning of these numbers is clear: a net discount of $576 to $680 million was recorded for these four individuals, and with the secondary sale of these shipments, gross profit and the difference rose to $1.5 billion.
This pattern is not the classic 'credit sale with return risk'; here, from the outset, a large discount guarantees profit, and then the risk of currency return falls on the National Oil Company and the macro economy. At the center of this boulder stands Mohammad-Hadi Momenin; someone whose name appears simultaneously in two lists: the list of bank debtors and the list of trustees who gained direct access to heavy oil shipments. Who signed off on this clear contradiction between 'eligibility' and 'access'? Which eligibility assessment structure overlooked the 743 billion toman bank debt file but handed over the key to the allocation of several tens of millions of barrels of crude oil?
Momenin; from 743 billion debt to ownership of an exchange and a network of companies
Mohammad-Hadi Momenin, born in 1989, is listed among the major bank debtors with a 743 billion toman debt to Kaarfarin Bank. As reported by 'Miz-e Naft', he has also had significant debts to Saman Bank and alongside these debts, he holds special shares in major transportation and airline companies like Mahan. This is just the banking layer of the story.
In company registration documents, Momenin's footprint is found in over 40 registered domestic companies. The list of positions shows a multi-layered executive and financial arm: board member at Pars Taban Sarv Company, vice-chairman of the board at Petro Sam Eurasia Company, board member at Tamin Tose'e Adrian Company, and owner and chairman of the board of Mohammad-Hadi Momenin Exchange and partners. This exchange has been introduced as his main currency arm; an arm whose duty in such networks is clear: covering transactions, rotating ownership, and passing funds through intertwined company loops.
The next significant point is the expansion of this network beyond borders. Momenin, by registering and directing companies in Britain — including Momenin Investment Group and Cellpack Ltd — and collaborating with international companies in Spain, has laid out a transnational map for cover operations and currency transfers. For credit sales of oil and multi-layered settlements, such a network is needed: legal partners in multiple jurisdictions, revolving accounts, and routes for the exit and entry of money that are compatible with sanctions pressures. This network has given him maneuverability; the ability to transfer, conceal, and suspend settlements.
$8 to $17 discount per barrel; what it means for the Iranian market
An $8 to $17 discount on 72 to 80 million barrels is, in itself, an accounting red line. This number, at the moment of allocation, deducts from the export value of Iran's oil and directly pressures the revenue balance of the National Oil Company. In the real market, such a discount has two immediate consequences: first, a reduction in the effective selling price for Iran compared to regional competitors; second, creating a playing field for secondary transactions that generate profit through 'differences' and 'route arbitrage'. When gross profit is estimated at $1.5 billion, it means a margin beyond a 'risk fee' has been transferred to the trustees. Here, the core question is clear: if the risk of currency return rests on the public treasury, why has the profit margin at this level been transferred to intermediary networks?
The energy market responds in one language: volume, price, destination, settlement. Volume has been allocated; price has been determined with a discount; destination has been moved in secondary markets; but settlement remains incomplete or suspended. This equation is completed with the case of 'Mohammad-Hadi Momenin'; where the financial and exchange network plays the role of slowing down or cutting off the return of resources.
$2 billion unreturned; where is the oil money parked and who should be accountable
Based on media reports, Momenin received about $2 billion from the resources obtained from the sale of Iran's oil during the receipt of oil shipments and did not return it to the country's economic cycle. This figure alone has a pricing effect on Iran's export market; because with the elimination of this currency input, the cost of financing the next export period inevitably increases, and the next discounted condensates must compensate for the liquidity shortage. The result is clear: a new discount to cover the wound of the previous discount.
This $2 billion figure is not a mere accounting discrepancy; it is the scale of the project. When a network with a dedicated exchange and legal arms in several countries sits at the credit sales table, 'parking' resources in intermediary accounts and 'rotating' funds between safe destinations becomes a daily tool. A clear answer must be provided as to who approved the credit level for such figures for Momenin, what liquid guarantees were obtained, and which responsible authority monitored the return of money at maturity.
Venezuela; a $1 billion gray area and Momenin's footprint
Momenin's name has also appeared in oil trade with Venezuela; a case that was halted with the arrest of the then Minister of Oil of Venezuela on charges of financial corruption, leaving about $1 billion of Iran's currency claims in a gray status. Here, too, the usual pattern repeats: credit sales, a high-risk market, bottlenecks in settlement, and a network that is active to cover routes. Reports consider Momenin one of the players in this project; with a role that ties the financial ambiguities of unreturned resources to his performance and his corporate network.
The routes of movement are also clearly described: after increasing regulatory and judicial pressures, Momenin moved from the UAE to Oman and then to China, from where he suspended settlements with creditors and official entities. This geographical rotation simultaneously sketches the currency map: from the Persian Gulf to East Asia, from exchange accounts to intermediary companies, from port to port; but without returning to Iran's accounts.
Supporters, covers, and the 'Shayan' ring
Access for a 37-year-old with a history of heavy bank debt to multi-billion dollar oil shipments is not possible without structural cover. Reports highlight a key name in the decision-making circle of the Ministry of Oil: Mohammad Bahmei; an influential figure in the financial decisions of the Ministry of Oil and the allocation of resources to trustees, introduced as Momenin's main supporter. Here, the question is direct and clear: what has been the level of authority, key signatures, and risk control mechanisms under whose management, and how was the 'eligibility' certificate for such a level issued?
The network of intermediary allies has also been outlined: Rouhollah Razavi, Ehsan Tahiri, and Mohammad-Javad Bavand have worked alongside Momenin in a circle that, under the cover of individuals with security and structural backgrounds — including a person with the alias 'Shayan' (former director general of fuel and energy) — received shipments, sold them on the black market, and ultimately evaded returning funds. Momenin has been the executive and currency arm in this network; utilizing the capabilities of multiple companies for laundering and transferring funds.
In such a model, if the 'supporter' opens the allocation path, the 'trustee' takes the shipment with a discount, the 'exchange network' spreads the funds, and the 'security cover' creates a shield, the final result is one thing: oil money flows into the internal network instead of the treasury, and later ends up in low-trace destinations. Here, the names are clear; the questions must also be clear, and the answers documented and substantiated.
The money chain; from discount to suspended settlement
In the oil market, every dollar discount on every barrel is either to attract a new customer or to cover risk. But when the discount is given to the intermediary arm and not the final buyer, and alongside it, the financial eligibility of the trustee has been weakened, a compounded risk is created: the risk of currency default. This is what is evident in Momenin's case. From the moment of allocation to the settlement deadline, everything must answer three questions: where is the guarantee, when does the cash flow settle, and who controls it?
In this case, the guarantee was not commensurate with the risk; the cash flow did not settle on time; and control was not only poorly executed but was weakened by the layers of cover companies and exchanges. When a dedicated exchange operates alongside multiple domestic and foreign companies, the possibility of 'converting' and 'transferring' funds to off-the-radar destinations increases. This is the very tool that leads to suspended settlements and the non-return of billions of dollars.
The market effect; when today's discount leads to tomorrow's deficit
The energy market is sensitive to price differences. When $8 to $17 per barrel is allocated as a discount, the market that buys this shipment in secondary markets creates a new reference price: a price that will be demanded in subsequent transactions. The result is that for the next wave of sales, either the discount must be repeated, or the market will buy with difficulty. Therefore, today's discount puts pressure on tomorrow's prices, and at the macro level, this pressure settles on the liquidity program of the National Oil Company and the country's foreign budget.
The $1.5 billion gross profit difference means the return rate for trustees has been much more attractive than the legal risk of default. When such a profit-to-risk ratio forms, the intermediary network's inclination to repeat the pattern increases; unless the chain of signatures, guarantees, and settlements is designed to be accountable and stringent from the outset.
Dozens of companies, one role: cover
Why are more than 40 companies seen in this model? The answer is simple: to cover ownership, diversify contracts, distribute legal risk, and create alternative payment routes. When one company faces risk, another enters the game; when one account is monitored, another continues the work. By arranging such a network inside and outside, Momenin has effectively created a multi-gateway system that allows funds to be layered and transferred. Company registration in Britain and activity in Spain, alongside a dedicated exchange, completes this picture.
This model has a simple economic root: if the official route is narrow due to sanctions, intermediaries buy, sell, and rotate by creating a 'parallel route'. The problem begins when the parallel route replaces the official route and, in the absence of control, becomes a destination itself; meaning the money stays in that parallel route instead of returning and the network feeds off it.
Names and signatures; where the bottleneck formed
The names in this case are clear: Mohammad-Hadi Momenin, Ali Bayandarian, Rouhollah Razavi, and Hossein Shamakani on the side of the recipients of the shipments; Mohammad Bahmei on the side of the influential figure in financial decisions and resource allocation; and 'Shayan' with managerial experience in fuel and energy as the upper cover of the network. At the execution level, Momenin's exchange and the internal and external circle companies were responsible for the transfer. The bottleneck is precisely where the allocation signatures and eligibility approvals were issued; the very place where three questions must be answered: who signed, with what guarantee, and with what currency return plan.
When shipments are allocated with heavy discounts, the signatory must put corresponding guarantees for this level of discount on the table: liquid collateral, a phased settlement plan, and control of the shipment's destination. All three have been deficient in the output of this case. The result is the accumulation of deficits in oil settlements and the remnants of resources that have not returned to the Iranian economy.
Unanswered questions that must be answered right here
This case has three definitive and non-deferable questions: first, what is the actual amount of Momenin's debt to the National Oil Company and banks, and which part of it is immediately collectible? Second, which entity and current managers approved the commercial, financial, and security eligibility of an individual with a history of heavy bank debt to receive billion-dollar shipments? Third, what credible guarantees were obtained for the return of this volume of national capital, and why is a significant portion of the resources currently suspended?
These questions are not for archiving; they are for correcting the cash flow of oil sales today. A clear answer to these three questions will make it possible to classify roles: who allocated, who transported, who sold, who transferred, and who held. And ultimately, who should return the money.
Social and economic impact; from bank balance sheets to people's tables
When $576 to $680 million in discounts is deducted from oil revenue in the short term and up to $2 billion in currency does not return, this deficit never gets lost in a vacuum; it overflows into bank balance sheets, exchange rates, public budgets, and the final price of fuel and goods. The 743 billion toman debt to Kaarfarin Bank is not just a number in a column; it disrupts the credit chain and raises financing costs. On the other hand, the trustee network with a gross profit of up to $1.5 billion does not leave the field; it repeats the field unless this path is closed.
For the people, the translation of these numbers is simple: when oil money does not return, the budget for development and welfare decreases, inflationary pressure enters through currency, and ultimately, the price of financial indiscipline is paid by the tables. Every dollar of unsecured discount is a new pressure on prices.
The role of media and the demand for transparency
Momenin's name appeared in the recent Hamshahri Online report alongside three other trustees, focusing public opinion on one point: eligibility assessment. When the media laid out the chain of figures — from 72 to 80 million barrels allocated to $576 to $680 million in discounts and up to $2 billion unreturned — there was no room left for generalizations about 'circumventing sanctions'. The opaque mechanism has not only failed to circumvent sanctions but has encircled national income. Transparency is the code name for returning oil money; transparency in signatures, guarantees, and settlements.
Conclusion; a case that must start from its headline, not its margins
Mohammad-Hadi Momenin is not an 'exception'; he is the product of a mechanism. A mechanism that has handed over credit sales to a network profit model instead of policy. The names are clear: Ali Bayandarian, Rouhollah Razavi, Hossein Shamakani, Mohammad-Hadi Momenin; the supporters are identified: Mohammad Bahmei in the financial decision-making circle; the covers are known: 'Shayan' and the security ring; the numbers are ruthless: 72 to 80 million barrels, $8 to $17 discount per barrel, $576 to $680 million net discount, gross profit up to $1.5 billion, 743 billion toman debt, $2 billion unreturned, and $1 billion in gray area in Venezuela.
This case must be closed from this headline: who signed, what was allocated, where was it sold, how was the money transferred, and today who should be held accountable. A clear answer means the return of money; and until then, every new discounted barrel is just a band-aid on an old wound.
Key figures
Volume allocated to four trustees from June to August 2026: 72 to 80 million barrels of crude oil.
Unit discount range: $8 to $17 per barrel, equivalent to about 8% of the price.
Total net discount paid to four trustees: $576 to $680 million.
Estimated gross profit and difference from secondary sales: up to $1.5 billion.
Amount of Mohammad-Hadi Momenin's bank debt to Kaarfarin Bank: 743 billion tomans.
Dimensions of unreturned currency resources attributed to Momenin's received shipments: about $2 billion.
Iran's currency claims in the Venezuela case involving Momenin: about $1 billion in a gray status.
Number of domestic companies related to Momenin: over 40 companies.
Key positions: board member of Pars Taban Sarv; vice-chairman of the board of Petro Sam Eurasia; board member of Tamin Tose'e Adrian; owner and chairman of the board of Mohammad-Hadi Momenin Exchange and partners.
International network: registered companies in Britain (Momenin Investment Group, Cellpack Ltd) and business cooperation in Spain.
